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I. INTRODUCTION
We have reached a critical point in the debate over whether to reform
current principles of private securities litigation. For roughly fifty years,
investors have looked to Rule lOb-51 as a remedy for losses caused by
securities fraud. Private actions under 10b-5 not only provide compensation for
investor losses, but they are also an indispensable means of enforcing federal
securities laws because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lacks
the resources to thoroughly police potential violations. 2
In recent years, however, critics have argued that current principles of
shareholder class action litigation impose a heavy burden on American
* Extern law clerk to Judge Eugene A. Wright of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit; B.S. and A.B., Ohio University, 1992; J.D., Seattle University
School of Law, 1995. Thanks to Kellye Testy for her many helpful suggestions, and to
Robert and Judy Cutting for inspiring this topic.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
promulgated the rule pursuant to its powers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The rule provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
2 See Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The resources of
the [SEC] are adequate to prosecute only the most flagrant abuses. To this end, private
actions brought by investors have long been viewed as a necessary supplement to SEC
enforcement actions.") (citation omitted).
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business. 3 These critics say that lOb-5 provides a basis for frivolous litigation
that undermines the efficiency of American business and hinders America's
global competitiveness. 4 Many critics argue that shareholders also suffer under
the current system because, after subtracting attorney's fees, the average
shareholder recovers only a small percentage of her actual loss. 5
The call for reform has been intensified by recent reports that small and
high-tech corporations are faced with an increasing and disproportionate share
of private securities actions. 6 The increase in suits against emerging businesses
is particularly relevant to concerns about the effect of shareholder litigation on
American competitiveness because these firms, which often introduce
innovative products, are the least able to bear the costs of shareholder suits.7
In response to concerns about abuse of Rule lOb-5 litigation, six bills to
amend the Securities Exchange Act have been introduced in both houses of the
Congress. 8 Each of these bills contains provisions designed to deter frivolous
3 See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici); 140 CoNG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dodd);
138 CoNG. REc. S12,599-601 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 138
CONG. REC. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Rep. Tauzin); Brent Bowers &
Udayan Gupta, Shareholder Suits Beset More Small Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9,
1994, at B1.
4 See id. Frivolous suits, also called "nuisance" or "strike" suits, are actions in which
the plaintiff is able to obtain a favorable settlement from the defendant even though the
defendant knows that the plaintiffs claim would be unlikely to prevail at a trial. David
Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REv. L. & EcON. 3 (1985). See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the
Plaint'ff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 669, 669-70 n.1 (1986).
5 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaint'ffs' Attorney's Role in Class
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58
U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1991); Frederick C. Dunbar & Vinita M. Juneja, Recent Trends II:
What Explains Settlements in Shareholder Class Actions? (National Economic Research
Assoc., White Plains, N.Y.), Oct. 1993.
6 See Bowers & Gupta, supra note 3, at B1 (citing a study conducted by Securities
Class Action Alert); Udayan Gupta & Brent Bowers, Small Fast-Growth Firms Feel Chill of
Shareholder Suits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1994, at B2; Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5; The
Impact of Securities Frauds on Entrepreneurial Companies, Survey (VentureOne, San
Francisco, Cal.), Jan. 1994.
7 See 140 CONG. REc. S3695, 3706-07 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statements of Sen.
Dodd and Sen. Domenici); 138 CONG. REc. S12,599-601 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992)
(statement of Sen. Domenici); 138 CONG. REc. E2463 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement
of Rep. Tauzin); Bowers & Gupta, supra note 3.
8 See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.
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litigation and to restructure class-action representation principles to better serve
the interests of investors. 9 The sponsors of the bills expressed a particular
concern for entrepreneurial corporations. 10 The major provisions include fee
shifting, proportionate liability, a heightened burden of proof, more stringent
pleading requirements, minimum holding requirements (ten thousand dollars or
one percent) for named plaintiffs, and a safe harbor for predictive statements.11
This Article examines the particular vulnerability of small corporations to
frivolous suits under Rule 10b-5. This Article also considers the likelihood that
the proposed congressional reforms will protect small corporations, while still
providing adequate protections for shareholders. Part HI sets forth the values
traditionally attached to private actions for securities fraud. Part II summarizes
a model of shareholder suits that suggests plaintiffs have economic incentives to
pursue claims with little or no merits. Part IV examines two studies that may
support this model. These studies provide empirical evidence that the merits of
a suit are in fact irrelevant to its settlement value. Part V addresses the recent
increase in shareholder suits against entrepreneurial corporations as well as
some possible explanations for this phenomenon. Part VI then examines the
provisions of the House and Senate Bills that are intended to deter frivolous
litigation. This Article asserts that many of the proposed reforms are not well
suited for protecting either investors or small corporations. This Article
681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Similar
versions of Senate Bill 240 and House Bill 681 were introduced in the 103rd Congress, but
the Congress did not act upon those bills before the session ended. See S. 1976, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 417, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For an updated listing of
the co-sponsors of the current bills, see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(for S. 240), Private Securities Enforcement Improvements Act of 1995 (for S. 667),
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995 (for H.R. 10), Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (for H.R. 555), Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act (for H.R.
681), and Securities Litigation Reform Act (for H.R. 1058), Bill Tracking Report, available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, BLTRCK file. The House of Representatives passed House Bill
1058 on March 8, 1995.
9 The bills include many other provisions, such as provisions to protect investor
plaintiffs from their own attorneys, but these reforms are beyond the scope of this Article,
which focuses on the effects of shareholder suits on small corporations.
10House Bill 681 states that "professional plaintiffs extract settlements from
entrepreneurs, regardless of the merits of the cases filed... investment bankers and
accounting firms [are compelled] to resist working with new venture firms." H.R. 681,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). Representative Bilbray, in introducing House Bill 10,
stated that "high tech, bio-tech and other growth companies... fear these abusive strike
lawsuits .... " 141 CONG. REC. E124 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bilbray).
See also 141 CONG. REc. E115 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey); 141
CONG. REC. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statements of Sen. Dodd and Sen. Domenici).
11 See infra part VI.
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concludes, however, that some of the proposed reforms, particularly the safe
harbor for predictive statements, can be modified to strike a more suitable
balance between the interests of investors and small corporations.
II. THE VALUES OF PRiVATE ENFORCEMENT
To examine the principles of shareholder litigation in any meaningful way,
one must first identify the policies that underlie private securities actions.
Therefore, before analyzing the theoretical and practical problems of
shareholder suits, this Article first addresses the goals sought to be attained
through these private actions.
Congress' declared purpose in enacting section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act" or the "1934 Act") 12 was to
prevent conduct designed to defraud or deceive investors. 13 The Supreme
Court has observed that the purpose of the 1934 Act and its companion
legislation is "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor... in the securities industry." 14 In order to meet this goal,
section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules implementing the policies
of section 10(b). 15 Pursuant to this authority, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5.
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 10(b) provides in relevant
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
13 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-90 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 226 (1980).
14 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Although lOb-5 does not expressly provide a private right of action, the courts
have interpreted 10b-5 to imply such a right.16
In light of the enormous resources that would be required for the
government to guard against violations of Rule l0b-5, courts and commentators
have endorsed the use of private actions to insure effective enforcement.17 The
role of shareholder suits in policing securities markets is often described as the
deputizing of "private attorney generals." 18 In theory, these private attorney
generals provide corporate management with an incentive to improve the
quality and quantity of public disclosures. 19 Accurate and timely disclosures (1)
aid capital formation by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the issuing of
new securities, (2) reduce research costs because corporate management is the
lowest-cost provider of information, and (3) allow better stockholder
monitoring of management.20
Because enforcement of securities laws serves the dual purposes of
compensating losses and deterring future wrongdoing,21 reforms that target
shareholder suits run the risk of undermining the effectiveness of private
enforcement and thus the enforcement of securities laws in general. 22 This
Article will address these risks following a discussion of the difficulties
associated with shareholder class actions.
16 See Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 358-59 (1991); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17 See Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1984); 5A ARNOLD S.
JACOBs, LrIGATION AND PRAcricE UNDER RULE lob-5 § 8.01, at 1-228 (2d ed. 1992)
(Private actions are "the most effective way to police lob-5 breaches.").
18 Judge Jerome Frank introduced this term to describe individuals who are authorized
to bring actions in the greater public interest. Associated Indus. Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694,
704-05 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 319 U.S. 739, vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). For
a summary of the history of private enforcement of the securities laws, see Coffee, supra
note 4. An excellent discussion of the current justifications for the private attorney general
concept is provided in Bryant Garth et. al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353
(1988).
19 See Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5, at 14.
20 Id.
21 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
22 See Adam F. Ingber, Note, l0b-5 or Not lOb-5?: Are the Current Efforts to Reform
Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S351 (1993). Ingber argues that the
proposed Rule lOb-5 reforms of fee shifting, proportionate liability, and higher burden of
proof, all contained in House Bill 417, should be abandoned because "all embody the
danger that they will increase the litigation burdens carried by plaintiffs; and all embody the
danger of hindering private enforcement of the securities laws." Id. at S366.
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IH. Tm ECONOMICS OF SHAREHOLDER SUrrS
Deferring a discussion of empirical evidence until Part IV, this Part first
outlines an economic model of shareholder suits that indicates strong incentives
for plaintiffs to pursue claims with dubious merits. This Part then examines the
particular relevance of this economic model to the circumstances of small
corporations.
A. The General Economic Model
Once a plaintiff has initiated an action, the corporate defendant has two
alternative means of protecting itself: (1) attempt to settle, or (2) prepare a
defense and seek a favorable judgment. As a rational creature of economic self-
interest,23 the corporate defendant will ordinarily pursue the least expensive
route. Therefore, a settlement will be more appealing whenever the cost of
settlement is less than the expected costs of litigation.
The choice described above is, of course, no different than the choice
facing any defendant in any civil action. Under an economic theory of typical
settlement behavior, we would expect that the settlement value of a particular
suit is determined by the estimated amount of a verdict favorable to the
plaintiffs, discounted by the probability of the plaintiffs' success on the
merits.24 In 10b-5 litigation, however, the plaintiffs have a strategic advantage,
because their litigation costs are typically much lower than those of the
defendant.25 As long as the complaint asserts an actionable legal claim, 26 the
23 Corporate officers and directors are under pressure to keep the market price of their
company's stock from falling. William C. Baskin III, Note, Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce
Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE L.J. 1591, 1598 n.50 (1990); see also Andrew E.
Serwer, What to Do About Legal Blacknail, FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 136, 137. A
partner with Shearman & Sterling says that companies facing a one hundred million dollar
lawsuit often think it prudent to settle for several million dollars, even after spending a
million dollars in legal fees. Serwer, supra. The stock price is influenced by the
corporation's reported earnings. Id. Therefore, managers must keep quarterly earnings
high, even at the expense of total long-term earnings. Id. This practice creates a focus on
the dollar value of settling versus litigating as the deciding criterion in the decision whether
to fight or settle. Id. Corporate managers also may not feel that their personal reputations
have been impugned or need defending, which makes them less inclined to fight based on
reasons not related to relative costs. Id.
24 See Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 503 (1991).
25 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithfid Chmpion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 17 [hereinafter
Coffee, The Unfathfid Chamnpion]; Coffee, supra note 4, at 697 n.79 ("The conventional
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plaintiffs' attorney will be able to use the discovery process to conduct
numerous depositions of the defendant's officers, and to request extensive
production of documents. The costs of this process to the corporate defendant
include not only attorney's fees, but loss of executives' time, loss of
reputational capital, and loss of managerial certainty. 27
In contrast, the average discovery costs imposed on 10b-5 plaintiffs are
much smaller. Liability in a lOb-5 suit turns mainly on issues relevant only to
the defendant's conduct such as scienter, 28 due diligence, and the adequacy and
accuracy of prospectuses, annual reports, or company press releases. Due to
the nature of these issues, the individual shareholder will possess little relevant
information. The discovery burden on the plaintiff has been further reduced by
the development of the "fraud-on-the-market" doctrine in shareholder
litigation, which may eliminate the need to prove actual reliance on the alleged
inadequate or misleading disclosures. 29
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,30 the Supreme Court
recognized the potential for abuse of the discovery provisions in shareholder
suits, describing the plaintiffs' ability to burden the defendant's resources with
a largely groundless claim as the "in terrorem increment of the settlement
wisdom is that litigation costs [in class and derivative actions] tend to be lower for plaintiffs
than defendants.").
26 See infra part V.F (discussion of pleading requirements).
2 7 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 701-02 & nn.93-94 for a more detailed discussion of
these costs.
28 Scienter is "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). Scienter is a required element
of a lOb-5 claim. Id. at 192 n.7, 193.
29 The fraud-on-the-market theory is based on the semi-strong form of the efficient
market hypothesis, which posits that the price of a security reflects all relevant publicly
available information. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059
(1990). Under the efficient market hypothesis, relevant misrepresentations defraud all
investors, regardless of their reliance on the misrepresentations, because misrepresentations
unfairly affect the market price of the security. Use of the fraud-on-the-market theory in
shareholder suits was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). Commentary on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine is
extensive. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with
Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984);
Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1 (1982); Macey & Miller, supra; Zachary A.
Starr, Fraud on the Market and the Substantive 7heory of Class Actions, 65 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 441 (1991).
30 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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value." 31 Not surprisingly, experienced securities attorneys become aware of
the relative difference between the litigation expenses of the opposing sides,
and learn to assess the size of that gap.32 Awareness of this imbalance works to
the plaintiffs' advantage, because it means that both parties will favor
settlement for an amount somewhere between the plaintiffs' cost of bringing
and maintaining the action and the defendant's cost of preparing a defense.33
With the knowledge that the defendant will prefer to settle for some amount
below the costs of preparing a defense, a reliable estimate of the cost
differential enables plaintiffs to capitalize on some portion of the imbalance
merely by filing suit, regardless of the merits. 34 This theory, applied to small
corporations, makes the potential for encouraging meritess suits even more
apparent.
B. Small Corporations and the Economic Model
For many large corporations, there may be incentives to resist frivolous
cases, even when doing so represents a significant cost above settlement.
Corporations that expect to become repeat defendants in shareholder suits
might choose to focus on the long-term effects of settling meritless claims,
opting to defend some actions now in order to deter others in the future.35
However influential this rationale may be for large corporations, it is
unlikely to affect the decisions of small corporations, 36 because these
businesses necessarily focus on short-term interests. Small, thinly-capitalized
corporations cannot afford to prefer protracted litigation over settlements. In a
31 Id. at 741.
3 2 See Coffee, supra note 4; Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 4.
33 See Baskin, supra note 23, at 1597.
3 4 This Article presents only a basic outline of the factors that encourage non-merit-
based settlements in shareholder suits. For additional theories, see Alexander, supra note
24, at 524-67. Theories include agency problems inherent in class actions; astronomically
high potential damages; the hours-based contingency compensation system for plaintiffs
lawyers; and insurance and indemnification rules that make substantial sums of money, not
paid directly by the parties, available for settlements but not for judgments. Id.
35 See Coffee, The Unfaithfd Champion, supra note 25, at 14. Repeat defendants such
as accounting firms and insurance companies seek reputations as "tough, hard-nosed
litigators who will not settle weak cases." Id.
36 This Article uses the terms "small corporation" and "entrepreneurial corporation"
interchangeably to refer to publicly held companies with limited assets and resources. The
words "business," "company," and "corporation" are also used interchangeably, and are
not intended to have individual significance.
[Vol. 56:555
TURNING POINT
recent survey of publicly held venture-capital-backed corporations, 37 those
companies that were targets of shareholder suits reported that they had spent an
average of $692,000 on legal fees alone. 38 This figure included dismissed or
settled cases, as well as pending cases, which means that the average legal costs
of litigating to a verdict would be much higher. 39 This figure was also limited
to the quantifiable expense of legal fees, without considering the other burdens
that litigation imposes on a company. 40 In light of the incredible costs, it would
be absurd for most small companies to defend shareholder claims in the interest
of long-term concerns, because the costs of the defense could bring an end to
the company.
As in any field of civil litigation, defendant corporations always have the
option of litigating cases they perceive as unfounded up to the summary
judgment stage before they consider settlement. This approach would allow
these corporations to isolate the costs of discovery from the costs of going to
trial, as well as permitting them to balance the discovery costs against the
likelihood of prevailing at summary judgment. Although the imbalance in costs
to opposing sides would still be present, some companies might find the
reputational interests discussed above more persuasive if they perceived a
likelihood of prevailing at summary judgment and cutting their costs short at
that point.
Several difficulties exist with this approach in shareholder suits. First, the
blend of law and facts inherent in lOb-5 issues makes these cases poor
candidates for summary judgment. Issues such as the materiality of undisclosed
information, the defendant's state of mind, and the reasonableness of
defendant's beliefs involve drawing inferences from a given set of facts and
circumstances, and these assessments are reserved for the trier of fact. 41
37 A venture-capital-backed corporation is a corporation embarking on a new or
turnaround venture that entails some investment risk but offers the potential for above
average returns. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990). Venture capital is
often provided by specialized firms whose investors are interested in speculative or high risk
investments. Id.
38 The Impact of Securities Frauds on Entrepreneurial Companies, supra note 6, at 4.
39 Id. The $692,000 legal costs figure was computed as an average of the responses of
all those companies which had been sued, including cases from the following categories:
dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff (7%), dismissed on motion to dismiss (12%), settled
(21%), and still pending (60%). Id. None of the cases had reached a verdict for the plaintiff
or the defendant. Id.
40 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 701-02 & nn.93-94.
41 Alexander, supra note 24, at 527 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 450 (1976)).
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Therefore, summary judgment is usually unavailable for lOb-5 litigation. 42
Second, the option of litigating weak cases to the summary judgment stage is
even less attractive to smaller corporations. Many of these defendants will have
a resource base that is too small to justify the risk of incurring the costs of
discovery for an unlikely hope of prevailing at summary judgment. For small
corporations then, the safest course will be to settle early, when legal costs are
low.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF MERiTS
In recent years, researchers have conducted two detailed studies on the
prevalence and effects of shareholder suits. 43 These empirical studies indicate
that current principles of lOb-5 litigation do produce the situation suggested by
the economic analysis described above: the settlement value of a shareholder
suit bears little relation to its merits. Whether these results actually validate the
economic model discussed in Part III or result from some other aspect of
shareholder suits remains open to debate,44 but these studies clearly lend
support to the argument that the current system of shareholder class action
litigation is being abused.
A. The Stanford Study
In 1991, the Stanford Law Review released a study by Professor Janet
Cooper Alexander regarding seventeen high-tech companies that made initial
public offerings (IPOs) during the first half of 1983. 45 Of these seventeen
companies, twelve companies experienced large declines in their stock price,
and nine of these twelve companies were targets in securities fraud class
actions. 46 At the time the study was published, eight of the suits had been
settled, with striking results: five settled for between 24.5 and 27.5 percent of
the damages sought, a sixth settled at 20.6 percent, and the remaining two
settled outside this range due to unusual circumstances. 47 This narrow range is
42 Id. at 526-28. Professor Alexander notes that recent trends may indicate an
increased availability of summary judgment. Id. at 527.
43 See id. at 505; Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5.
44 For an attack on the assertion that plaintiff's attorneys have strong incentives to
bring meritless actions, see Coffee, supra note 4, at 698.
45 See Alexander, supra note 24, at 507, 510.
46 See id. at 511.
47 See id. at 517. The settlements in the two cases which fell outside the narrow range
of the other suits can be explained by factors not related to the merits. Id. In one of the
cases, the corporation had become insolvent and the individual defendants had no significant
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inconsistent with a general economic model of settlement behavior.48 Under a
general economic model, settlements would be expected to vary widely as a
percentage of the damages sought, due to the wide degree of possible variations
in the merits of a given plaintiff's case.49 However, the narrow range of the
settlements in Professor Alexander's study does comport with results predicted
by the model of shareholder suits, which suggests that settlements in securities
class actions will be independent of the merits of a particular case.
Professor Alexander's study also noted that several of the cases
experienced events in the course of litigation that ordinarily would be expected
to have an impact on the outcome of a case.50 For example, in a case that
settled at almost exactly twenty-five percent of the damages sought, a district
court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on damages
while settlement negotiations were underway. In the opinion of Professor
Geoffrey Hazard, who testified as an expert for the plaintiffs, this ruling
reduced the plaintiffs' maximum recovery at trial from approximately forty-five
million dollars to fifteen million dollars.51 None of the other cases in Professor
Alexander's sample experienced an event of such significance, and yet the case
in question settled within the same narrow percentile range as the other cases,
further suggesting the irrelevance of the merits of a case to its settlement value.
B. The NERA Study
A 1993 study conducted by National Economic Research Associates52
(NERA) also provides evidence that settlements in shareholder suits bear little
relation to the merits of a claim. This study examined 154 settlements in
shareholder suits from July 1991 through June 1993 and attempted to determine
the extent to which the merits of these cases affected their settlement values.5 3
personal assets from which to satisfy a judgment. Id. at 517-18. In the other case, the
unusually low settlement can be explained by a combination of two factors. Id. at 518. First,
the market price of the securities in question had plummeted sharply before the time of the
alleged fraud, so that the overall stakes of the suit were comparatively low. Id. Second, this
case was the only case not filed in the Northern District of California; it was filed in the
District of Utah, where few securities cases are brought and where the presiding judge
appears to have been unsympathetic to plaintiffs in such cases. Id. at 518.
48 See Alexander, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
49 See id. at 514. For two cases to have identical merits, "the [defendants'] degree of
culpability and the evidence available to prove it [must be] equal." Id.
50 See id. at 519.
51 Id. at 519-20.
52 See Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5.
53 Id.
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The approach taken by the NERA study was to examine two factors that,
in theory, should improve the plaintiffs' chances of winning, and then
determine whether the presence of either of these factors actually resulted in
higher than average settlements.5 4 The first factor that the NERA study
identified was whether or not the case involved a securities offering. 55 If a
securities offering is involved, there is a potential claim for a violation of
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, in addition to the Rule 10b-5 claim.56
Whereas 10b-5 requires the plaintiffs to prove scienter, 57 section 11 imposes
strict liability for material misstatements in a registration statement unless the
defendant can prove nonnegligence. 58 Because the plaintiffs' burden is reduced,
one would suspect that a verdict in their favor is more likely under section 11
than under Rule 10b-5.5 9 In practice, however, the study showed that the
presence of a section 11 claim was always statistically insignificant to the
settlement amount, a result that is "discouraging for the argument that the
merits matter." 60
54 Id. at 10.
55 Id. at 1-2.
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988). Section 11 provides a statutory remedy to persons
who acquired securities issued under a registration statement containing a false statement of
a material fact or omitting a statement of material fact that the registrant was under a duty to
disclose. See id.
57 See supra note 29.
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k@b) (1988); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
381-82 (1983); Chang v. Moon, [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,209, at 94,863 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 1992); Moore v. Keegan Management Co., 794
F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
59 See Ingber, supra note 22, at S361. Ingber argues that Professor Alexander's
conclusions are in error because she failed to account for the presence of § 11 claims in
some of the cases in her study. Id. Ingber's premise is that because § 11 allows a
presumption of negligence for faulty registration statements, the presence of § 11 claims
will render the facts irrelevant in the cases where the defendants cannot rebut this
presumption. Id. Therefore, he argues, similar settlement values do not necessarily mean
that merits are unrelated, because the presence of § 11 claims greatly reduces the number of
variables in the merits of a case. Id. at 361-62. There are at least two problems with this
argument. First, the NERA study demonstrates that the presence of a § 11 claim has a
statistically insignificant impact on settlement value. See supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text. Second, if § 11 claims did have an impact on settlement value, we
should expect a lesser variance in Professor Alexander's sample only if all the cases
involved § 11 claims, which is by no means clear from her article. See Alexander, supra
note 24, at 509 n.36 (stating that "legal theories included claims for violations of federal
securities laws, section 11 ... and Rule 10b-5." (emphasis added)).
60 Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5, at 11.
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The second factor that the NERA study identified as a potential indicator of
merit was an independent enforcement action by a federal or state agency. 61
The presence of such activity, especially if it resulted in an order, indictment,
or plea, might indicate a stronger case for the plaintiffs. 62 Like the presence of
section 11 claims, the statistical impact of government action was also found to
be insignificant. 63 To see if more severe enforcement action mattered, the study
divided cases into three levels, from simple investigations up to a finding that
violations had occurred. 64 Here the NERA study found that even a government
finding of securities violations produced no correlative increase in the
settlement value of a private action. 65
C. The Significance of Meritless Settlements
Given the evidence that settlements in shareholder suits do not reflect the
merits of a case, a serious question arises as to whether private securities
actions are meeting their asserted goals. In a system in which the settlement
amount of a lawsuit does not reflect estimated liability, corporate management
has little incentive to increase the quality of its disclosures. Good management
behavior is not rewarded where all management behavior, regardless of intent,
is subject to penalty.66
The absence of any correlation between merits and settlement value also
places a burden on publicly-held companies that may not be justified by the
asserted benefits of shareholder suits, even if these benefits are actually being
achieved. A system in which weak claims have the same settlement value as
strong claims encourages plaintiffs to proceed with claims that they would not
otherwise pursue. This increases the total number of lOb-5 suits, which results
in an unjustified cost for publicly-held corporations. Frivolous suits not only
impose immediate expenses upon defendant corporations, but they may have
other repercussions as well. Potential defendants, such as banks, accounting
firms, and outside directors, may shy away from companies which are more
likely to be targets of shareholder suits. 67
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. The correlation factor for government actions, although statistically insignificant,
actually had a negative effect on the settlement value. Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 14.
67 See 138 CoNG. REC. S12,600-01 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
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V. THE BURDEN ON SMALL BusINESS
Recent trends indicate that shareholder suits are focusing more on smaller
corporations, and less on the major corporations that were involved in giant
takeovers, mergers, and the collapse of the junk-bond market in the 1980s and
early 1990s.68 In addition, a disproportionate amount of the total number of
shareholder suits filed between 1991 and 1993 were against companies in the
volatile high-growth technology industry. 69
While no existing research suggests that entrepreneurial or high-tech
companies are more deceitful or negligent than other companies, a number of
factors may explain the increase in suits against these companies. As observed
earlier, shareholder suits are more burdensome for smaller companies because
these companies have fewer available resources and thus a stronger incentive to
settle in order to avoid extensive legal fees. 70 In a system that encourages
meritless suits, the burden on small companies is magnified. Plaintiffs will be
aware of the substantial incentives for small companies to settle claims for an
amount below their costs, and these companies will become more attractive
targets. Thus, the very companies that can least afford to take a hit will be
targeted more frequently.
Small companies also prove attractive targets for shareholder suits because
they are more likely to show large fluctuations in stock prices. 7' The fortunes
of emerging companies are inherently unpredictable, and therefore earnings
often fall short of analyst's expectations. Shares of small high-technology and
biotechnology firms in particular tend to trade at high price-to-earnings ratios,
reflecting hopes of a big payoff.72 For the same reason, however, the stock
price can plunge at the first hint of a setback.73 Class action securities litigation
against small companies also appeals more to plaintiffs because these
companies have less burdensome shareholder-notification requirements than
68 See Bowers & Gupta, supra note 3, at B1 (quoting James Newman, editor and
publisher of Securities Class Action Alert); Walter Wingo, How aass-Action Suits Inpede
Innovation, DESIGN-NEWs, Aug. 16, 1993, at 16 (quoting Edward R. McCracken, president
and CEO of Silicon Graphics, Inc., who describes abusive suits against small, risk-taking
corporations as a "tax on innovation").
69 See Serwer, supra note 23, at 137; 140 CONG. REc. S3695 (daily ed. Mar. 24,
1994) (statement of Sen. Dodd); Dunbar & Juneja, supra note 5, at 15, table 5.
70 See supra part III.B.





those of large corporations, which can cost more than one million dollars in
mailings alone for some major corporations. 74
Shareholder suits are particularly burdensome for small companies. In a
survey of small businesses released by the National Venture Capital
Association (Venture Capital survey) in January 1994, seventy-one percent of
those companies polled said that they were more reluctant to discuss company
performance with analysts, sixty-one percent reported increased liability
insurance costs, and thirty percent said they had experienced difficulties in
retaining outside directors.75 In addition, these companies reported spending an
average of $692,000 on legal fees, 76 1,055 hours of management time, and
$4.5 million for a typical settlement.77
The experience of Exabyte Corporation, a Longmont, Colorado maker of
computer-data storage devices, provides a typical example of how shareholder
suits burden small companies. In 1992, Exabyte reported that its third-quarter
earnings would be lower than analysts' projections, because of the introduction
of a new product.78 Exabyte's stock dropped from twenty-three dollars per
share to fourteen dollars per share, and a number of shareholder suits followed.
Even though the cases were dismissed in June 1993, the company experienced
many of the typical symptoms reported by companies in the Venture Capital
survey. Exabyte spent more than $100,000 in legal costs, saw its insurance
premiums double between 1992 and 1994, and reported difficulties in
recruiting new board members and senior executives. 79 Exabyte's CEO also
announced that in order to avoid future suits, the company would make no
predictions or forward-looking statements in its 1993 annual report. 80 The
experience of Exabyte is not an unusual one; in fact, the prevalence of such
cases has lead to a business environment in which a drop in stock price of more
than a few percent virtually guarantees a shareholder suit.81
The increase in shareholder suits against small corporations presents an
enormous obstacle to innovation. For many entrepreneurial businesses, going
74 See id. (quoting James Newman, editor and publisher of Securities Class Action
Alert).
75 77w Impact of Securities Frauds on Entrepreneurial Companies, supra note 6.
76 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
77 See The Impact of Securities Frauds on Entrepreneurial Companies, supra note 6.




81 See Wingo, supra note 68, at 16; Tower C. Snow, Jr., Stock Crash Needn't Lead to
Legal Hash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at A14 (stating that a stock decline of just 10%
can provide a sufficient basis for a shareholder suit; a drop of 25% or more virtually
guarantees a lawsuit).
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public is the only way to raise enough capital to develop a new product or
technology. But the large legal fees, increased liability insurance, and hefty
settlement amounts imposed by the current system can be enough to drive an
incipient company into bankruptcy. 82 The innovative capacity of those
companies that can survive a shareholder suit is also hampered, because
payments for settlements are often paid out of a young company's research and
development budget.83
The likelihood of shareholder suits also makes it difficult for small
corporations to attract outside directors. Outside directors can provide valuable
business experience to startup companies, 84 but these directors will avoid many
small corporations because these businesses are often unable to obtain directors
and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance). 85 D&O insurance insulates
corporate managers from personal liability for securities violations, but few
insurance carriers offer D&O coverage to small corporations, and those that do
charge exceptionally large premiums. 86 For example, Armada Corporation saw
its rates for ten million dollars of D&O insurance coverage increase from
$47,000 in 1985 to $720,000 in 1989; the deductible meanwhile increased from
$125,000 to $750,000.87 In response, Armada eliminated its coverage and
eight of its ten directors resigned. 88 The company's president stated that
Armada decided they could only afford to have low-net worth individuals to
replace the directors who left; the company was forced to elevate net-worth
above experience as a determining criteria for selecting new directors. 89
82 Testifying before the Senate Securities Subcommittee, the general counsel for Intel
stated that, had Intel been sued when it was starting up, such a suit probably would have
bankrupted the company long before it invented the microchip. 140 CONG. RBc. S3706
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
83 See id.
84 For commentary on the value of outside directors, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43
STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the
Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 25 (1987); Paul H. Zalecki,
The Corporate Governance Roles of the Inside and the Outside Directors, 24 U. TOL. L.
REv. 831 (1993).
85 See John S. Demott, Duck and Cover, CFO, Feb. 1994, at 38 (citing a Louis Harris
& Assoc. poll which showed that approximately 90% of outside directors believe inadequate
D&O insurance is a disincentive to joining a board).
86 See Judy Semas, Rpe Targetsfor Lawsuits; Focus: Business Insurance, Bus. J., Jan.
31, 1994, at 19; David C. Jones, Special Report: Professional Liability Review, NAT'L
UNDERWRrrER, Nov. 8, 1993, at 10.





The effects of this system on American business are obvious: discouraging
innovation cripples global competitiveness. 90 The current system also
undermines one of the fundamental principles of the Securities Acts:
encouraging disclosure. 91 Drawing from the misfortunes of companies like
Exabyte, corporate attorneys have learned that any predictions or forward-
looking statements should be avoided because they may come back to haunt the
company if stock prices drop.92 This reticence to issue forward-looking
statements undermines the adequacy and accuracy of corporate disclosure. 93
Because investments are inherently forward-looking, such statements have great
value to investors. 94 Forward-looking statements are particularly valuable with
regard to new businesses, because these companies lack the record of past
performance that analysts would ordinarily consider in gauging the value of the
securities. In light of these problems, it is clear that we must change the current
system if we are to nurture small businesses and encourage complete
disclosure.
VI. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REFORM
In response to an increasing cry for reform, provisions to reduce abusive
litigation were included in six separate bills to amend the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.95 The sponsors of these bills argued that they are necessary to
safeguard the interests of new and high-technology corporations. 96 This Part
examines whether the key provisions of these bills will in fact protect small
corporations while still encouraging private enforcement. This Part concludes
90 140 CONG. REc. S3706-07 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statements of Sen. Domenici
and Sen. Mikulski).
91 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
92 See Snow, supra note 81, at A14. "Whether a projection had a reasonable basis,
whether adverse facts were known at the time of the projection, and whether the projection
was made in good faith invariably become the focus of litigation. Leave the forecasting to
the financial community." ld.; see also Bowers & Gupta, supra note 3, at B1.
93 See infra part VI.E.
94 See John S. Poole, Management Forecasts: Do They Have a Future in Corporate
Takeovers?, 42 Sw. L.. 765, 792-93 (1988).
95 See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.
681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
96 See 141 CONG. REc. S1075 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1995) (statements of Sen. Domenici,
Sen. Dodd, and Sen. Mikulski); 141 CoNG. REc. E115 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement
Df Rep. Markey); 141 CONG. REC. E124 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Rep.
3ilbray).
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that many of the proposed reforms would either fail to protect small
corporations or would deter private actions altogether. Some of the proposals,
however, particularly the safe harbor for predictive statements, show more
promise for an adequate balance between encouraging private enforcement and
protecting small businesses.
A. Fee Shifiing
All of the proposed bills for securities reform contain a provision for fee
shifting of one form or another. 97 These provisions would displace the
"American rule" of civil litigation, in which each side pays its own litigation
costs, 98 in favor of the "English rule," in which the loser pays the winner's
costs. 99 Upon motion by the opposing party, the prevailing party would be
entitled to full attorney's fees. Except for House Bill 10, the bills would limit
fee shifting to those cases where the losing side's position was not
"substantially justified." 100 The purpose of fee shifting is to create "adequate
incentives for evaluating the merits of a case prior to filing and to create
disincentives for filing meritless securities fraud lawsuits." 101
97 See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102 (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 102(a) (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). Ironically, the fee shifting provision of Senate Bill 240 appears
in a section entitled "Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure," S. 240 § 102(a), which
supposedly encourages private actions by speeding up the recovery for plaintiffs with strong
cases. See 141 CoNG. REc. 1091 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
98 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
Fee shifting exists by statute in other areas of litigation and may in fact be as prevalent
as the traditional American rule. See Coffee, supra note 4, at 670 n.2.
99 See Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, 'Loser Pays'--Attorneys' Fees in
England, Germany, N.Y. L.., Oct. 15, 1992, at 3, 3.
100 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102 (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 102(a) (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th
Cong., ist Sess. § 3 (1995).
101 S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b)(2) (1992). This language is from the
securities reform bill that was introduced in the Senate in 1992. Senate Bill 240 does not
explicitly state the purpose for the fee shifting provision, but Senator Dodd, who co-
sponsored the bill, offered a similar justification to that found in Senate Bill 3181: "[tlhese
and other reforms should end the race to the courthouse by lawyers eager to file a case
without investigating the facts...." 141 CONG. REC. S1091 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dodd).
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The practical effect of fee shifting would be to deter not only frivolous
suits, but meritorious ones as well. This is because the only sensible way for
plaintiffs' attorneys to locate potentially meritorious suits is by filing suit
whenever there is a sudden and significant decrease in stock price.' 02 There is
no way to evaluate the merits of a case before filing, because the essence of the
claim is that the managers of the corporation had knowledge of adverse
information that they withheld from the shareholders. The only method for
determining whether a violation actually occurred is through the tools of
discovery. 103
The exemption from fee shifting for cases that are "substantially justified"
does nothing to protect meritorious claims. Because discovery provides the
only practical method for determining whether a claim is substantially justified,
plaintiffs will be discouraged from filing any claims at all, for fear that
discovery would fail to yield a substantially justified claim. If no violations
were discovered, the plaintiffs would then be forced to pay not only their own
discovery costs, but the discovery costs of the defendants as well. 104 This harsh
result would provide a strong disincentive to the discovery of securities fraud.
Given the importance of these private actions to the effective functioning of the
securities laws, this solution is unacceptable. 10 5
The fee shifting provision of Senate Bill 240 contains an additional twist. It
provides that fee shifting shall not apply to plaintiffs who never owned more
than one million dollars of the securities in question. 106 To the extent that the
one million dollar exemption would remove the deterrent effect of fee shifting
for some meritorious suits, Senate Bill 240 does encourage private actions, at
least in comparison to the broad fee shifting provisions in House Bill 10 and
House Bill 681.107 What remains unclear, however, is the rationale for
applying fee shifting to plaintiffs with holdings in excess of one million dollars.
102 See Alexander, supra note 24, at 513.
103 See id. at 513-14 (citing Coffee, supra note 4, at 679).
10 4 House Bill 555 would apply fee shifting only after an early evaluation period. H.R.
555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995). The other bills would apply fee shifting after any
final judgment. S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 102 (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). House Bill 1058 mitigates
the harshness of fee shifting by allowing the court to determine if fee shifting would be
"just." House Bill 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995).
105 See Ingber, supra note 22, at S369 n.126. Ingber criticizes the "substantially
justified" exemption on the grounds that it will lead to additional litigation. Id. He argues
that the exemption will raise problems such as the number of issues or the amount of
damages the plaintiff must win to "prevail." Id.
106 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(a) (1995).
107 See id.
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As noted, plaintiffs are unable to determine the merits of a case before
filing and would thus be discouraged from filing at all if they had to take the
risk of absorbing the legal fees for both parties. Although wealthier
shareholders will be in a better position to accommodate this risk, there is no
reason to believe they would be willing to do so, unless one assumes that most
large drops in stock price are accompanied by securities violations. If this were
true, the risk of fee shifting might be outweighed by the high probability of
discovering a meritorious claim. This assumption, however, appears highly
suspect. Even in a world where fraud never occurred, price drops would still
exist whenever a company's fortunes, or the market in general, took a sudden
downward turn. In these situations, corporate managers will often be without
advance notice of a sudden price drop; when they do have notice, fear of
lawsuits will provide a strong incentive for disclosure. Thus, Senate Bill 240's
fee shifting provision would deter any claims by wealthy shareholders, while
still permitting even meritless claims by shareholders with an interest of less
than one million dollars. This provision is not well tailored to meet the needs
of small business or shareholders, and should be abandoned.
B. Burden of Proof
House Bill 681 also contains a proposal to change the burden of proof in
securities fraud cases. 108  The Bill proposes changing the current
"preponderance of the evidence" standard to a requirement of "clear and
convincing evidence."' 0 9 Because the clear and convincing evidence standard is
more rigorous than the preponderance of the evidence standard, securities fraud
claims would be more difficult to prove, and theoretically, plaintiff; would then
be deterred from filing frivolous claims.
The burden of proof provision fails to remedy the problem of frivolous
litigation for small corporations. The chief problem for small corporations is
not that securities fraud is too easy to prove at trial, the problem is that the
enormous costs of litigation force many smaller corporations to settle claims
before they ever get to trial.110 To the extent that the potential risks of a trial
would be reduced, some companies might be less inclined to settle, but a
heightened burden of proof would do little to discourage frivolous suits against
108 See H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995).
109 The clear and convincing evidence standard governs common law fraud, but this
standard was rejected for securities fraud for two reasons: common law remedies were
thought to be ineffective against securities law violations, and the Congress wished to
impose a higher standard of conduct in the securities industry. Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387-89 (1983). See Ingber, supra note 22, at S372-74.
110 See supra part V.
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businesses that are forced by economic necessity to settle before the case ever
reaches a verdict. Changing the burden of proof would only provide those
companies that can afford to mount a defense with a better chance of prevailing
in close cases. This change would not only fail to discourage meritless claims
against small businesses, but it could arguably encourage violations by large
corporations by making securities claims easier to defend."1
C. Proportionate Liability
The third major provision is a proposal to replace joint and several liability
with proportionate liability for those defendants whom the trier of fact does not
specifically determine to have engaged in "knowing securities fraud." 12 Under
current law, a court that finds a defendant guilty of a Rule lOb-5 violation will
hold that defendant responsible for the entire amount of damages, regardless of
degree of fault.' 13 Critics of joint and several liability in securities cases argue
that plaintiffs are able to settle against some defendants to pursue litigation
against a "deep pocket" joint tortfeasor. 14 The deep pocket defendant is then
forced to settle in order to avoid the prospect of full liability. This may result in
a situation where a less culpable defendant ends up paying more than a more
culpable defendant. Proportionate liability aims to avoid this situation by
holding minor participants liable only for the damages attributable to their
respective degree of culpability. 115
Like the burden of proof provision, the proportionate liability provision
does little to ease the plight of small business. With the adoption of
111 See Ingber, supra note 22, at S372-74. Ingber argues that raising the burden of
proof would undermine the high standard of conduct sought to be imposed on the securities
industry. Id.
112 See S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 104 (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3 (1995). The proposal for proportionate liability in Senate Bill 240 actually differs
from the House Bill 681 proposal in a number of ways. First, Senate Bill 240 requires that
in the event that a plaintiff is unable to recover damages from a defendant, other defendants
would be forced to contribute, but their contribution would be limited to a percentage of the
outstanding balance proportionate to their fault, or five times their gain from the fraudulent
transaction, whichever is greater. S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1995). Second, a
plaintiff who loses a significant portion of her net worth would be entitled to full recovery
from the defendants, who are in that case jointly and severally liable. Id.
113 See SD JAcoBs, supra note 17, § 260.030], at 11-228 (2d ed. 1992).
114 See 140 CONG. REC. S3706-07 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
115 See 141 CONG. REC. S1075-76 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Domenici).
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proportionate liability, plaintiffs might in fact lose some of their leverage for
forcing deep pocket defendants into settlement. Smaller corporations, however,
would not benefit from proportionate liability unless they had the resources
necessary to fund a lengthy litigation. As noted, corporations with fewer
resources have a strong incentive to settle due to the expense of litigation,
irrespective of their potential liability at trial. Proportionate liability would not
prevent meritless suits against companies who are forced to prefer a settlement
which is less than the costs of litigation.
D. Elimination of Professional Plaintiffs
The proposed bills all contain provisions that could potentially reduce
frivolous suits by doing away with "professional plaintiffs," who own small
amounts of stock in many companies and bring a suit whenever one of their
investments goes down. 116 In addition to receiving a share of the eventual
settlement or award, judges often reward these plaintiffs with "incentive
payments" as a reward for stepping forward.1 17
All six bills would eliminate the use of "incentive payments" for named
plaintiffs. 118 Senate Bill 240 and House Bill 10 would also set minimum
qualifications for named plaintiffs. 119 These provisions would require that, in
order to obtain certification as a class representative, named plaintiffs show that
they owned either one percent or ten thousand dollars in market value of the
securities in question. 120 In addition, House Bill 10 and House Bill 1058 would
require that named plaintiffs could not participate in more than five class
actions during any three year period, 12' and Senate Bill 667 as well as House
Bill 555 would require them to certify that they did not purchase the securities
116 See 141 CONG. REC. S1091 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
1 17 See Andrew Leigh, Being a Plaintiff Sometimes Amounts to a Profession,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAiLY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 8. ("Incentive payments" may be $10,000,
$15,000, or as high as $100,000).
118 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 101
(1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(a) (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3 (1995).
119 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 203 (1995).
120 Id.




in question with either the intent of commencing litigation or at the direction of
plaintiffs' counsel. 122
The existence of professional plaintiffs has been well documented by courts
and commentators, 123 and some repeat players are legendary. For example,
Harry Lewis is a retired attorney who has been the lead plaintiff in an estimated
three to four hundred lawsuits. 124 In Steiner v. Tektronix, Inc.,125 the court
described the potential for abuse of the securities laws at the hands of
professional plaintiffs. The court stated that:
[t]he goals of these acts-protection against fraud, promotion of honesty
and fair dealing-are indeed worthy.... At the same time, the court must
guard against litigious stock market profiteers who, in response to stock
downturns, hire seasoned lawyers to look for any evidence or act that might
through tortured reasoning give some vague implication of fraud. 1
2 6
This description of the professional plaintiff sounds like a clear abuse of
the legal system. Instead of turning to the legal system for redress of a harm,
the professional plaintiff deliberately seeks out claims from which a profit can
be made. This view of the professional plaintiff, however, may not square with
reality. Professor John Coffee of the Columbia University Law School has said
that "[a]s a practical matter, the lawyer has hired the client rather than the
client hiring the lawyer."127 Professor Coffee refers to a system in which
plaintiffs' attorneys use computers to monitor stock prices and maintain lists of
potential plaintiffs. When the computer alerts the attorney of a potential case,
he checks his list for available plaintiffs. 128
The limit of five suits per three years and the threshold requirements for
named plaintiffs would indeed make it more difficult for individual plaintiffs to
122 S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 102 (1995).
123 See, e.g., Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992);
Koenig v. Benson, 117 F.R.D. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). In Koenig, the court observed that
the plaintiff had filed 39 securities actions in three years, and had such a heavy caseload that
he could not remember whether his cases were still active or had been settled. Id. at 334;
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the lass Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
IND. L.J. 625 (1987); William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord I, Towards a Relaxed
Swnmary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A New Weapon Against
"Strike" Suits, 15 DEL. J. Coap. L. 921 (1990); Macey & Miller, supra note 5.
124 See Leigh, supra note 117.
125 817 F. Supp. 867 (D. Or. 1992).
126 Steiner v. Tektronix, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 867, 886 (D. Or. 1992).
127 See Leigh, supra note 117.
128 Id.
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hunt for claims, and the prohibition on incentive payments would reduce the
motivation to do so. But these provisions would not keep plaintiffs' attorneys
from doing their own hunting. They could still monitor stock prices and seek
out appropriate plaintiffs whenever they observed a sharp decline. Plaintiffs'
attorneys would simply have to keep larger lists of investors, which is easily
done through a referral network of brokers, dealers, accountants, and attorneys
in other fields. 129
E. Safe Harbor for Predictive Statements
Another provision that is intended to reduce frivolous shareholder suits is a
proposed safe harbor for predictive statements. 130 The objective of this
provision is to encourage disclosure and to provide procedural tools to deal
with frivolous cases based on corporate predictions. 131
The first part of this provision encourages the SEC to adopt a rule or
recommend legislation establishing criteria for an exemption from Rule lOb-5
for forward-looking statements concerning future economic performance. 132
This part of the provision would make no change in the current law, because
the SEC has already enacted a rule establishing a safe harbor for predictive
statements. 133
However, the safe harbor provision does include some measures that
would effect significant changes in the current law. The provision creates a
procedure whereby a defendant can apply for a summary judgment
determination of whether the safe harbor exemption applies. 134 In Senate Bill
240 and House Bill 10, plaintiffs are allowed sixty days of discovery before
such a motion can be made, but once the motion is filed, the court must grant a
129 See Coffee, supra note 123. The use of referral networks may be somewhat
curtailed by provisions in the proposed bills preventing the payment of referral fees. See S.
240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)
(1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). Nothing in these bills, however,
would prevent the use of referral networks altogether.
130 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 107(a) (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 205 (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong.,
lst Sess. § 104 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1995).
131 141 CONG. REC. S1075-76 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
132 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 201(a) (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 107(d) (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(a) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 104 (1995).
133 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175, 240.3b-6 (1993).
134 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 107(d) (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 104 (1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 5 (1995).
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stay of discovery until it rules on the motion. 135 The safe harbor provision
encourages the SEC to enact rules or make recommendations regarding the
standards applying to these motions. 136
Although the SEC already provides a safe harbor for predictive statements,
this safe harbor affords little protection from suits based upon predictions gone
sour. The current safe harbor provides that forward-looking statements will not
be considered fraudulent "unless it is shown that such statement was made or
reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good
faith." 137 Whether a prediction was reasonable or made in good faith are
frequently topics of litigation; the current safe harbor is thus unable to prevent
lawsuits over predictive statements. 138 Because this safe harbor cannot prevent
litigation of predictive statements, corporations have a strong incentive to avoid
these statements altogether.
Discouraging predictive statements harms the interests of businesses and
investors alike. Forward-looking information allows efficient allocation of
resources, providing the market with additional information with which to
gauge the value of a given security. 13 9 As long as predictions are characterized
as predictions, and not as statements of fact, they will be looked upon with
suspicion in the market, and the market price of the securities will reflect the
discounted value of the prediction.' 40 In this way, predictive statements allow
investors to make more informed investment decisions, because the price of a
security will incorporate a greater amount of information. The use of forward-
looking statements is also very valuable to small businesses as a method of
raising capital for new projects. By offering estimates of upcoming trends,
businesses can generate investor interest, which probably explains why
companies still use predictive statements despite their potential as litigation
weapons.
The safe harbor provision would remove much of the disincentive against
forward-looking statements by resolving the applicability of the safe harbor in
the early stages of litigation. Because the provision would limit the amount of
135 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(c) (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 107(d) (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 104 (1995).
136 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. § 201(a) (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 205(a) (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1995).
137 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(a), 240.3b-6(a) (1993). The SEC's safe harbor is also
limited to forward-looking information that eventually appears in documents filed with the
SEC. See id. §§ 230.175(b)(1), 240.3b--6(b)(1).
138 See Poole, supra note 94, at 774-75; Snow, supra note 81, at A14.
139 140 CONG. REC. S3705 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994).
140 See Paul P. Brountas, Jr., Note, Rule 10b-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures
to Securities Analysis, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1517, 1541 (1992).
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discovery permitted before a ruling on the safe harbor issue, small corporations
could defend claims based on predictive statements without incurring the
ordinarily prohibitive costs of a resolution at trial.
Assuming that the SEC would apply the safe harbor requirements already
in effect, shareholders could still recover for fraud based on predictions that
were unreasonable or made in bad faith. These issues, however, would be
resolved according to SEC standards in a summary judgment proceeding,
rather than after a trial. To the extent that shareholders would be denied the
benefits of a lengthy discovery period and a full trial on the applicability of the
safe harbor, this rule would partially restrict private enforcement. Unlike the
fee shifting provision, however, this restriction of private enforcement would
be a minor one. The safe harbor provision would not remove a class of Rule
lOb-5 claims altogether, but would provide a procedure for a less expensive
resolution of these claims. The restriction on private enforcement would be
outweighed by the benefits gained through encouraging predictive statements
and reducing the burden of frivolous lawsuits on small corporations.
One difficulty with the proposal for an early resolution of the safe harbor
issue is that the limited discovery aspects of that provision in Senate Bill 240
and House Bill 10 are not well focused. These Bills propose allowing sixty
days of discovery before the filing of a motion for resolution of the safe harbor
issue, and the scope of the discovery during that period would be unlimited.
This would undermine the cost-saving purposes of early resolution by
subjecting defendants to two months of discovery on issues potentially
irrelevant to the applicability of the safe harbor.
A method of focusing the discovery measures in the safe harbor provision
would be the use of a Limited Discovery Proceeding (LDP).141 Under an LDP,
if the defendants asserted the safe harbor defense in their answer to a
complaint, the judge would permit discovery for the limited purpose of
resolving issues relevant to that defense. Discovery would be permitted only as
reasonably necessary to discover facts indicating that the predictive statement in
question was made unreasonably or in bad faith.' 42
141 See Baskin, supra note 23, at 1604-09. Baskin discusses "LDP" in the context of
pleading requirements, but this technique could also be successfully applied to the safe
harbor exemption. See infra part VI.F.
142 Three of the bills have a procedure similar to the LDP suggested here. Senate Bill
240 and House Bill 10 contain an "alternative dispute resolution procedure." S. 240, 104th
Cong., 1st. Sess. § 102 (1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1995). Senate Bill
667 and House Bill 555 contain an "early evaluation procedure." S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 102 (1995); H.R. 555, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102 (1995). These provisions could
greatly reduce the cost of defending shareholder suits by limiting the time for resolution and
the cost of discovery. Unfortunately, no strike suits would actually be deterred by these
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The LDP would provide plaintiffs with access to any available facts to
rebut defendants' arguments for the application of the safe harbor rule. The
LDP would also postpone discovery on other issues until after the resolution of
the safe harbor issue. The specific methods of discovery to be allowed would
be left to the discretion of the judge, who could apply a standard that minimizes
the cost of compliance while still allowing the plaintiffs to discover the
necessary information. If the plaintiffs prevailed on the safe harbor issue, then
they would be allowed to proceed with full discovery on other issues. Adding
an LDP provision would further reduce litigation costs for defendants without
obstructing the path to private enforcement.
F. Pleading Requirements
The six bills also include a provision setting forth specific guidelines for
pleading securities fraud. 143 This provision would require plaintiffs to allege
specific facts demonstrating the state of mind of each defendant at the time of
the alleged violations. 144 Senate Bill 240 states that the purpose of the pleading
requirement provision is to "provide a filter at the pleading stage to screen out
allegations that have no factual basis, to provide a clearer statement of the
plaintiff's claims, and to provide greater clarity about the scope of the case." 145
Since the 1976 Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
scienter has been a required element of private actions under Rule lOb-5.1 46
Although the Supreme Court did not indicate in Hochfelder what pleading
standard should be applied to the scienter requirement, the circuits had already
applied the pleading standards of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to 10b-5 actions. 147 Rule 9(b) requires that allegations of fraud or
procedures, because they require the consent of all the parties. The plaintiffs in a strike suit
have absolutely no incentive to consent to a quick and inexpensive early evaluation; the
more expensive and time consuming the process is for the defendants, the more leverage the
plaintiffs have in forcing a settlement. See supra part Ill. The safe harbor provision of
House Bill 1058 does contain an LDP type provision, which limits discovery to issues
relating to the safe harbor. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1995).
143 S. 240, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 104 (1995); S. 667, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103
(1995); H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1995); H.R. 681, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3
(1995); H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995).
144 Id.
145 141 CONG. REc. S1076, 1086 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
146 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); see supra note 28
(definition of scienter).
147 See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973); Kellman
v. ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1309 (6th Cir. 1971).
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mistake must be stated with particularity. 148 The Federal Circuit Courts have
failed to agree on exactly how Rule 9(b) applies to the pleading of scienter, and
two opposing approaches have emerged. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
requires plaintiffs to plead specific circumstances that lay a factual foundation
for scienter. 149 The First, 150 Third, 151 Sixth, 152 Ninth, 153 and Tenth154
Circuits do not require specific circumstances or evidence indicating scienter in
a Rule lOb-5 complaint.
The proposals here would adopt the interpretation of Rule 9(b) set forth by
the Second Circuit. This position would reduce frivolous litigation in two
ways. First, instead of being pressured into a quick settlement, defendants
would be offered the opportunity to dispose of suits at the pleading stage for a
relatively low cost.155 Second, this position would reduce the disparity between
litigation costs for plaintiffs and defendants because plaintiffs have an increased
level of inquiry necessary to meet the stricter pleading requirement.' 56
Like the fee shifting provision, however, the requirement that scienter be
pled with particularity disposes of meritorious claims as well as meritless ones.
Evidence indicating a defendant's state of mind is virtually impossible to
discover without conducting depositions and examining documents. Requiring
plaintiffs to produce such evidence before discovery is "putting the cart before
the horse." 157 For this reason, a number of commentators have criticized the
position of the Second Circuit.' 58
148 FED. R. C1v. P. 9(b) provides: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally."
149 See Stem v. Leucadia Nat'l Corp., 844 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 852 (1988); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir.
1987); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 558 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); see also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 405
(7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 473 U.S. 606 (1985) (requiring pleading with particularity for fraud
claims under RICO).
150 McGinty v. Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633 F.2d 226, 228 (1st Cir. 1980).
151 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 273 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
152 Auslender v. Energy Management Corp., 832 F.2d 354, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1987).
153 In re Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
154 Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Carlstedt, 800 F.2d 1008, 1011 (10th Cir. 1986).
155 See Baskin, supra note 23, at 1601.
156 Id.
157 Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of ivil
Procedure, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 433, 468 (1986).
158 See id.; E.A. Lees, Rule 9(b)-Wwz Needs It?, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 105 (1976);
William M. Richman et al., The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason, 60 S. CAL. L.
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Like the safe harbor for predictive statements provision, the provision for
pleading with particularity could balance the interests of deterring frivolous
suits and promoting private enforcement if it included a measure for limited
discovery. If plaintiffs otherwise meet pleading requirements for lOb-5 but
failed to allege scienter with particularity, the court could authorize an LDP. 159
If plaintiffs failed to uncover specific facts giving rise to an inference of
scienter after an LDP, their case would then be dismissed. Relative to the
current proposal, an LDP provision would represent an additional cost to
defendants, but this cost would be outweighed by allowing plaintiffs to use the
tools of discovery to uncover potentially meritorious cases. 160
VII. CONCLUSION
The increasing number of shareholder suits against small corporations,
along with evidence that the settlement values of these suits do not reflect their
merits, raises serious concerns about current principles of shareholder
litigation. The costs of these suits include settlement payments, lost executive
time, managerial uncertainty, and difficulty in attracting outside directors. The
combined effect of these costs is tantamount to a tax on innovation. 161
Reformers of securities litigation, however, must be ever wary of the
danger of overcompensating for current problems and discouraging the private
actions necessary to enforce the federal securities laws. The current proposals
are not well tailored to meet the needs of either investors or small businesses.
Perhaps this is because these bills were introduced more as a political response
to a societal perception of excessive litigation than out of concern over the
particular problems of shareholder suits. 162
REV. 959 (1987); Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal avil Rule 9(b): Do We Need
Paricularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143 (1985).
159 See supra part VI.F. For a detailed discussion of the use of LDP for scienter issues
in 10b-5 suits, see Baskin, supra note 23, at 1604.
160 House Bill 1058 has an LDP type provision that provides for limited discovery on
the issue of scienter, but this provision only applies where the complaint already satisfies the
strict pleading requirements. H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995). This would not
alleviate the harshness of the Second Circuit rule.
161 See supra note 68.
162 See Ingber, supra note 22, at S357. Ingber notes Senator Domenici's comments on
behalf of the original Senate Bill that "[society is] suffering from hyperlexia, a serious
disease caused by an excessive reliance on law and lawyers. It is pervasive throughout our
society but has reached epidemic dimensions in the court-created private actions brought
under section 10(b) of the [1934 Act]." Id. (quoting 138 CONG. REc. S12,599 (daily ed.
Aug. 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici)).
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The provisions for fee shifting and strict pleading requirements would
serve to discourage all securities suits, not just meritless ones, and the
provisions for a higher burden of proof, proportionate liability, and threshold
requirements for named plaintiffs would do little to protect small corporations
from abuse. The Congress should focus on the provisions for particularized
pleading and the safe harbor for predictive statements, in combination with the
LDP, in order to reach a compromise between allowing frivolous suits and
discouraging private enforcement altogether. This focus would provide the sort
of finely calibrated approach that is needed in an area of complex litigation.
